An Interview with Antonio Barcelona and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza

by Joseph Hilferty

Abstract

Antonio Barcelona Sánchez (Universidad de Murcia) and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza (Universidad de La Rioja) are two of Spain's leading metaphor and metonymy specialists. They also happen to be distinguished members of the worldwide cognitive-linguistics community. Both very graciously agreed to this joint interview.

1 Cognitive Linguistics and Metaphor

Question: How did you come into contact with cognitive linguistics? Were you dissatisfied with the framework you were working in, or was it just sheer coincidence?

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: I began doing linguistics in the mid-1980s. I did generative phonology and from there jumped into language acquisition studies that had a strong generative bias. However, I felt that the type of phenomena that generative linguistics covered was very limited.

I saw essentially the same problem in other formal approaches that I began to explore at the time, like relational grammar, Montague grammar and generalized phrase structure grammar. The focus was on phenomena like agreement, grammatical relations, *wh*-movement, unaccusativity, and a few other things. It was all syntax and symbol manipulation and I thought of language in a different way. I saw linguistic systems as usage-based systems. I thought of grammar a subservient to communicative purposes and had the strong feeling that the range of phenomena to be addressed by linguists should be broader in scope and should be determined by communicative needs.

I was aware of the existence of other linguistic traditions, mainly European structuralism, Halliday's systemic functional grammar and text Linguistics, so I

began searching there and became deeply interested in pragmatics and functional models of language, especially Halliday's systemic functional grammar.

In 1991 I finished my PhD thesis, which focused on how different knowledge structures were used to produce communicatively effective discourse. In doing my PhD research I became acquainted with the artificial-intelligence version of frame-semantics and with many related notions of cognitive psychology. So when I turned my eyes back to Hallidayan linguistics I saw a big problem there. Pragmatics was ignored and there was no theory of conceptualization.

Through the late Professor Leocadio Martín Mingorance, who was a member of my PhD dissertation committee, I first learned about Simon Dik's Functional Grammar. This model had a greater appeal to me, since it postulated that grammatical description needed to achieve pragmatic and psychological standards of adequacy. It also included considerations of typological adequacy, but I was not interested in typology at the time. I was happy enough to find a model that was sensitive to communication and conceptualization issues. Interestingly enough, I found that there was a degree of coincidence between Simon Dik's goals and the by-then quite popular relevance-theoretic approach to language, where communication and cognition went hand in hand.

In 1993 I attended a linguistic seminar organized by the University of Seville where George Lakoff and Susumo Kuno were the two invited speakers. I was impressed by the quality of their presentations, but felt particularly attracted to Lakoff's ideas. I saw Lakoff's formulation of the so-called "cognitive commitment" as the cognitive linguistics counterpart of Simon Dik's standard of psychological adequacy that he put forward for his functional grammar, although over the years—especially with Lakoff's turn to combining neurology and linguistics—the cognitive commitment has become much more ambitious than Dik's standard of psychological adequacy.

I was also able to see that construction grammar was a more elegant and parsimonious model of grammar than most functional approaches; many mapping rules and procedures were avoided through inheritance mechanisms. And cognitive semantics descriptions of idealized cognitive models (including rich frame specifications, metaphor, metonymy, and image schemas) was much more ambitious and also cognitively more realistic than any functional description of the lexicon.

Nonetheless, I was disappointed by the general disregard for pragmatic adequacy that was evident in most cognitive linguistics theorizing at the time. So I had a transition period in which I kept doing functional grammar and a lot of pragmatics, while trying to make my analyses as sensitive as possible to such things as basic-level categorization, prototypicality effects, and frame-like structuring of the lexicon.

It would take some time for me to become fascinated by the pervasiveness of metaphor and metonymy in language. My first attempt at doing cognitive linguistics seriously can be traced back to 1995, when I began working on my own version of what a relational-semantics account of propositional knowledge should look like. At around that time I met Antonio Barcelona who was working on metonymy (the Cinderella of idealized cognitive models, you know; so much work had gone into frames, prototypes, metaphor, and image schemas while so little attention had been paid to metonymy) and I realized that part of my data could be better explained on the basis of metonymy than by specifying more and more semantic relations on the propositional level.

Antonio Barcelona: In my case, both factors were involved. When I first got in touch with cognitive linguistics (or rather, with conceptual-metaphor theory) back in 1979, I was a visiting scholar at Berkeley. I happened to attend, in the Winter quarter that year, George Lakoff's seminar "Language and Experience," where (apart from many other things) he presented the draft version of the book *Metaphors We Live By*, which he was writing with Mark Johnson. Mark attended part of one of the sessions and talked to us briefly on the philosophical aspects of their theory.

At that time, too, I was doing my literature review for my Ph.D. dissertation on constituent order in English and Spanish, and found that, with very few exceptions (Heles Contreras and a few others), the scanty published generative research on the topic was very poor, missing the most important functional and pragmatic factors motivating constituent order alternations. Functionalist schools (especially the Czech functional perspective tradition and Halliday's functional-systemic approach) had much more to offer in this respect. The sympathy manifested by the Lakoffs, by Fillmore, by Chafe (all of them at Berkeley at the time) and by Langacker toward functionalist approaches attracted me to their own research, where I found many useful insights in it.

When I returned to Berkeley in the Fall of 1984, I was able to read and enjoy George's first draft (written in November 1984) of his masterful *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*, and Langacker's Indiana Linguistics Club draft of the first volume of his *Foundations*, also published that year. These two books convinced completely of the superiority of a cognitive approach to the study of language over any other approaches, including the other functionalist ones.

Question: You both have worked quite a bit on metaphor and metonymy. What makes it such an interesting research topic?

Antonio Barcelona: Answering this question in any detail would require at least a full-length article! Suffice it to say that conceptual metaphor and metonymy seem to be involved in one way or another in an enormous range of conceptualization

phenomena and in most of linguistic structure and language use. Restricting our attention to language use, if we leave aside such utterances as the analytic philosopher's pet example *The cat is on the mat*, there are indeed very few actual utterances (or their written counterparts) where metaphor or metonymy, particularly the latter, do not play some role. Just think of the ubiquity of active zone/profile discrepancy phenomena, which are regarded by Langacker as types of metonymy (by the way, even the above cat example could be argued to exhibit at least one such metonymy —-only one part of the cat's body can normally be in contact with the mat). But even under a more constrained view of conceptual metonymy, metonymy turns out to be extremely frequent.

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: Metonymy became central to my own research into knowledge organization. It allowed me to simplify the amount of definitions and associated semantic relations on the frame-like, propositional level of analysis. Then I realized that metonymy was perhaps even a more central phenomenon to language than metaphor. Antonio shared basically the same idea and we began reading each other and expanding our views on the power of metonymy. We could see metonymy at work as a way of generating so-called pragmatic inferences, and also as motivating some grammatical phenomena like categorial and subcategorial conversions, syntactic alternations, and even anaphora. A whole new world opened up before my eyes that allowed me to understand so much better the motivation for many processes which I previously thought were unmotivated.

Question: Much of the work on metaphor and metonymy is quite theoretical. Do you think that enough of an effort is being made to back the theory with empirical evidence? Or to put things another way: is introspection enough or do we need to pay more attention to empirical methods?

Antonio Barcelona: Well, no sensible cognitive linguist would claim that introspection is enough and that empirical evidence should not be sought for. But, in my view, metaphor and metonymy research has always been quite data-driven, so perhaps the charge of excessive theorizing is not that fair. Most of the basic-level or high-level metaphors and metonymies proposed so far for English at least have normally been arrived at on the basis of a sizeable amount of everyday linguistic expressions.

That said, the richer the empirical basis, the closer the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy will be to reflect actual facts. Thus, work on the basis of large corpora is desirable (to check the systematicity of the linguistic manifestation of conceptual metaphors and metonymies, most particularly of their combinations) and neuropsychological research (in cognitive psychology, in psycholinguistics and in neuropsychology) is also necessary to verify some of the claims of cognitive lin-

guists regarding the cognitive reality of metonymies and metaphors, and to connect them with other mental and neural processes.

In the Euroconference on metaphor and metonymy which John Barnden and I organised in Granada in 2004, part of the emphasis was laid on this latter type of empirical research (the other major focus being AI approaches to metaphor and metonymy), with several interesting presentations on neuroimaging techniques in metaphor research, on psychological experimentation, etc.

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: Empirical methods are very important in research. Cognitive linguistics is no exception. In fact, empirical validation is at the heart of the cognitive commitment, as was defined by George Lakoff quite some time ago. There are broadly speaking three ways in which cognitive linguistics can be and is in fact empirical: one has to do with psycholinguistic experimentation (e.g. Ray Gibb's work), another with findings in the brain sciences (e.g. the neural theory of language (NTL), work by people like Feldman and Narayanan), and the third one with the use of corpora (I'd say that as far as cognitive linguistics is concerned the emphasis on corpus-based accounts is greater in Europe than in the US).

The insights coming from empirical work in these three broad areas are quite impressive but some integration work is required. For example, think of time metaphors that have been extensively investigated by Lakoff and Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh. Linguists working exclusively on the basis of linguistic data will be able to make a number of important observations and subsequent generalizations as to the way we use time metaphors in language. That's primarily how we know that we use space to talk about time (as when we say *a long time*, *a short time* or *halfway through the class*).

But how can we know if these metaphors are simply linguistic conventionalizations or do we actually use them to think? Cognitive linguistics is essentially interdisciplinary, so this question is just a natural part of its research agenda. To answer the question we have to turn our eyes to psycholinguistic experimentation, to research like Boroditsky's work. Through some priming experiments, this psychologist has been able to show that people actually use space to think about time. So you have this experiment where the ambiguous expression *the meeting has been moved forward two days* gets interpreted as 'two days after the moment of speaking' or 'two days before the moment of speaking' depending on whether the subjects where previously told to imagine moving toward an object or the object approaching them. In my view this suggests that *move forward*, when applied to time has no conventional meaning but its meaning is worked out on the spot.

Boroditsky has also shown that time metaphors are not universal. For example, in Chinese time may move vertically while in English it moves horizontally. These

findings are complementary of what the linguist can say. They also give some clues to the brain scientist who is interested in making connections between language and the sensorimotor systems of our brains. Think again of the idea of *moving forward* when it relates to the future. We may hypothesize that we think of the future as being in front of our eyes—this is why saying that we *move forward* into the future makes a lot of sense—because of the front position of our eyes in the body. So linguistic evidence and psycholinguistic evidence come together to suggest that there is a neural coactivation of spatial and time notions which possibly have a sensorimotor grounding.

Interestingly enough, in Boroditsky's experiment the priming activity is based on a simulation, which in neural terms is the result of the activation of so-called canonical neurons (the so-called mirror neurons fire when the action is actually seen). It is now thought that there are neural nets in the premotor cortex that usually fire motor cortex neurons for physical activity but that can be inhibited and their circuitry applied to other brain areas for abstract reasoning. In my view, this may explain why the priming activity works so well to reveal experientially-grounded abstract reasoning processes.

Question: Do metaphor and metonymy play a role in grammatical processes?

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: They do. In various ways. Think of the Golbergian notion of construction. This notion is far superior in terms of explanatory elegance to what lexicalist theories can tell you about the motivation of syntactic structure. Take, for instance, the caused-motion construction as in *John laughed Peter out of the room*. You would never say that we have to postulate a special argument structure for the intransitive verb *laugh* whereby it may take an extra argument.

Not all morphosyntactic patterns can be predicted from the lexicon. This is evident. Now, many caused motion expressions make use of metaphor and image schemas, as is revealed in the alternation between *Dinosaurs went out of existence millions of years ago* and *A meteorite sent dinosaurs our of existence millions of years ago*. This is a pattern that is sensitive to metaphorical and image-schematic thought. I don't think that the meaning of expressions like *come into existence*, *go out of existence*, and *put out of existence* is conventional or idiom-like. I rather believe that it derives from the combination of constructional and lexical meaning, where the construction has a clear metaphorical and image-schematic component.

Think of the syntactic structure associated to the verb *address* in *The captain addressed a few words to the soldiers*. To me it is interesting to note that the structure is parallel to the one used for the verb *give*, as in *He gave the book to Mary*, which exploits the path schema in focusing on the movement involved in a transfer of possession (away from the giver toward the receiver). In the case of the verb *ad-*

6

dress we have a case of figurative movement. The words are seen as objects that go from the captain to the soldiers. We could perhaps postulate that since the soldiers, in receiving the words become their figurative possessors, we have a the metaphor COMMUNICATING IS GIVING. Why not think that this metaphor underlies the syntactic pattern of sentences like the one just cited and related ones: *He said/spoke a few words to the soldiers*, *He communicated his thoughts to me*, *I mentioned the incident to her*, etc. If that is the case, what we have is motion used to account for transfer of possession, which is in turn used to talk about communication. Metaphor is what licenses the application of a syntactic pattern typically associated with a lexical class to other lexical classes.

Now, let's take metonymy. I have explored many ways in which metonymy may underlie some grammatical phenomena such as the recategorization of nominal and verbal predicates, valency extension and reduction, and cases of subcategorization conversion. I have done this work in cooperation with colleagues from the University of la Rioja and we have published several papers on the issue. One of them is the paper "Metonymy and the grammar: motivation, constraints and interaction," published in *Language & Communication* in 2001 and written in collaboration with Lorena Pérez. The other, "Metonymic motivation in anaphoric reference," was written with Olga Díez and published in 2004 in the volume *Studies in Linguistic Motivation*, edited by Gúnter Radden and Klaus Panther in the *Cognitive Linguistics Research* series (Mouton).

To give an example of how metonymy may be involved in grammar, consider the phenomenon that Jackendoff has described as "enriched composition." Jackendoff applies this term to explain the semantic interpretation of sentences like *He enjoyed/began the book*. The verbs *enjoy* and *begin* subcategorize action predicates like reading. So *He enjoyed the book* means in many contexts 'He enjoyed reading the book'. Jackendoff points out that in cases of enriched composition the hearer has to find in the world knowledge structure of the complement an extension of it that is compatible with the complementation pattern of the verb.

But why talk about "composition" then? Why not say that "He enjoyed the book" is based on a metonymic shift from object to (typical) action (in which the object is involved)? The metonymy OBJECT FOR ACTION applies to a whole class of examples, with verbs like *choose*, *finish*, *miss*, *try*, and *want*. In the example under discussion, there is no enriched composition, only a metonymy from 'book' to 'action in which the book is typically involved' (usually reading or writing).

I'm also interested in what Lakoff called some time ago "image-schema transformations." Compare *John walked over the hill* with *John lives over the hill*. Lakoff postulates a PATH/END-OF-PATH transformation to explain the second sentence. However, I would say that what we have here is a metonymy whereby the whole path

schema is invoked to stand for part of it. The sentence *John walked over the hill* somehow presupposes that John has moved up the hill and then downward from that position. *John lives over the hill* may be paraphrased as "John lives at the end of the path which runs over the hill," which evidences the existence of a metonymy.

Antonio Barcelona: I definitely agree with Paco. Both metaphor and metonymy play a fundamental role in grammatical processes. And in both cases, Langacker has pointed out the fundamentally metaphorical nature of grammatical structure and the fundamental role of metonymy in grammatical constructions like raising, topic-comment, anaphora, and quite a few others. Lakoff, Sweetser, and Traugott, among many other linguists (Paco Ruiz de Mendoza, Günter Radden, Klaus Panther, Goossens, Pelyvas, (modestly) Barcelona, etc.) have echoed and amplified these claims. Linda Thornburg, Klaus Panther, Günter Radden and I are editing a collection of essays on metonymy and metaphor in grammar (which will soon be published by Benjamins), where overwhelming evidence drawn from many languages is provided of the pervasive role of metonymy and metaphor in grammar.

The role of metaphor seems to be more "generic," in the sense that most grammatical constructions can be seen as metaphorical extensions into abstract domains of our schematization of basic bodily experiences along the lines of what Paco says. Metonymy, on the other hand, seems to be more directly involved in the extension of grammatical form and meaning, i.e. in the motivation of the new senses of grammatical forms, in the motivation of the transient or permanent reclassification of certain grammatical constructions (i.e. conversions of nouns into verbs like to land, or of proper nouns into common nouns like *That student is a real Aristotle*), or (less often) in the motivation of forms of a lexeme or a construction (as in *I like 'er*, where *'er* is a weak form, or as in certain types of ellipsis).

However, this does not mean that each is restricted to these functions: If metonymy typically motivates metaphor, as Goossens, Radden and I have claimed in some of our papers, then metonymy is at the bottom of the metaphorical extension of our schematization of basic bodily experiences into abstract domains that leads to grammatical structure; and metaphor accounts for the semantic extensions of numerous grammatical forms (e.g. *You gave me an object – You gave me an idea*).

Metonymy seems to be particularly pervasive in lexicogrammatical structure. I am at present completing a a book where I study the frequent simultaneous role of metonymy at various grammatical levels (including morphemes and morphology) and in the pragmatic meaning of one and the same utterance and discourse fragment.

Question: Where do you see cognitive linguistics heading in the near future? What about metaphor and metonymy research in particular?

Antonio Barcelona: This is difficult to foresee. I hope the history of cognitive

linguistics will not end with its founding fathers (I remember listening to Susumu Kuno saying that the moment Chomsky dies generative linguistics will die too). The initiators of cognitive linguistics (George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, Leonard Talmy, etc.), are still relatively "young" and healthy, but in any case this intellectual movement does not just depend on a handful of scientific personalities. A huge mass of young talent is attracted to the field every year.

What is more important, the main tenets of cognitive linguistics make it possible for it to adapt quite easily to new developments in psychology and neuroscience, since, given our cognitive commitment, cognitive linguistics is not necessarily committed to one particular model of the mind and the brain (at this moment, to a mild version of non-modularism or holism), but to the model that, given the state of our knowledge about the brain and the "mind" at a any given time, seems most plausible psychologically and neurologically, and most compatible with the structure of languages and with the facts of language use.

Probably cognitive linguistics will keep enlarging its cross-linguistic and cross-cultural database in the near future and will also keep enlarging its empirical basis, in particular, its psychological and neurological basis. It will also continue its in-depth exploration of English and other major languages (despite the massive body of published research on the English language from a cognitive linguistic perspective, there are large areas of English grammar and vocabulary not yet tackled from our perspective). Another trend that will continue will be the combination and cross-fertilization between various descriptive models evolved within cognitive linguistics (say, blending and construction grammar).

As for metaphor and metonymy research, an urgent need is to set up a good inventory of high-level, basic-level and primary conceptual metaphors in English, annotated with examples (lexical, grammatical, pictorial, reasoning patterns and others) from various periods of the language. A similar inventory of high-level and lower-level metonymies in English, annotated with similar examples, is also badly needed. Both inventories, despite their inevitable imperfections, would constitute useful reference points in cognitive-linguistic research.

These inventories should also be set up in other languages and might eventually be used to check the degree of universality of metaphors and metonymies. Another important area where we need more studies is the uncovering of the complex patterns of interaction between metaphor and metonymy. And the study of the role of metaphor and, particularly, metonymy in grammar and discourse still requires much more research. Finally, we should strive to clarify some minor disagreements regarding the notions of metaphor, metonymy, and their distinction.

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: I also think that this is a rather difficult question.

There are many possible directions. But what I can see with a lot of clarity is cognitive linguistics expanding and becoming a very powerful interdisciplinary paradigm. You know, I was the head organizer of the 8th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference in La Rioja. We all thought we would have about 400 participants after the abstract refereeing process was over. Well, we had well over 600 people attending, most of them making excellent presentations. And many came from Eastern European and Asian countries that had not shown such an active participation before.

In any event, I think that cognitive linguistics is now developing in the direction of finding common grounds with neighboring approaches to language. Up until now, there has been quite a lot of emphasis on making cognitive linguistics come to terms with empirical evidence from psychology and the brain sciences. Now, we see some attempts to find common ground between cognitive linguistics and functionalism, or between cognitive linguistics and pragmatics, or on making use of the powerful conceptual and analytical tools provided by cognitive linguistics to account for literary and discourse phenomena. This is going to become, in my view, a very important path of development. Other fruitful directions are the applications of cognitive linguistics to understanding language acquisition, language teaching, cross-cultural communication, anthropology, computational linguistics, signed languages, among other language-related disciplines and subdisciplines. Interdisciplinary pursuits and the applied perspective are essential for cognitive linguistics to become a more robust research paradigm.

If cognitive linguistics remains as an intellectual isolate, even if it shows strong ties with the brain sciences, it will be very difficult to prove its strength. The test of a theory is its applicability and I presume that cognitive linguistics is indeed very strong. There has recently been, for example, a lot of ground-breaking research by Michael Tomasello, from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology on language acquisition. In part of this research, it has been shown that children do not learn and use the same units as adults. They create their own units. So when children want to say something, they make use of set expressions from previous experience which they put together in accordance to their communicative needs.

These findings fly in the face of many universalistic postulates that have been guiding pedagogical work in language teaching. It is to be expected that insights like this will shape the way in which we approach the language teaching problem in a more realistic manner in the near future. Now we have metaphor and metonymy. These are a central part of language and thought. It is virtually impossible to talk and even reason without them. And they are part of the language learning process, a crucial part. So why not focus our efforts on how to help second language students to learn the way metaphor and metonymy are made use of in the target language?

Why not help them develop the same kind of "instinct" native language users have when they reason in everyday life?

Then we have the question of artificial intelligence and automatic translation. How can we have a machine emulate a human being and understand and process text like a human being, and therefore interact with human beings in a natural way, unless we develop ways in which these machines can learn to think metaphorically and metonymically? But this is extremely difficult, of course. Here I think we have to go beyond merely listing metaphors and their systems of correspondences. Why teach a machine LOVE IS A JOURNEY, A CAREER IS A JOURNEY, A BUSINESS IS A JOURNEY and so on, when it is perhaps enough to teach the primary metaphor GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS, which is the central correspondence common to all these low-level systems?

I have the feeling that we need a similar approach for other cognitive models too. Think of the different meanings of the adjective *good* in phrases like *a good neighbor*, *a good fight*, *a good meal*, *a good vitamin complex*, *a good symptom*. The meaning of the adjective good varies with the situation in which it is used and it would be pointless to go about listing lots of different senses for *good*. There should be a way in which we can teach a machine to make inferences based on contextual or situational features, just like we do. Or to put it differently, we would have to develop systems that behave as if they were "embodied" as we are. Here, work on contextualized simulations is crucial.

2   Linguistics in Spain

Question: I want to ask some questions about studying linguistics in Spain. I think that most people recognize that the notion of School of Philology is somewhat schizophrenic. Nowadays, language and literature studies are very specialized—there's virtually no crossover. Does our educational system need to take this into account? Or is it absolutely important to carry on teaching Jane Austen alongside the latest theories in linguistics? Are metaphor and metonymy studies something that can bridge this gap?

Antonio Barcelona: It's not easy to answer this question. Is it desirable for a linguist to have a good knowledge of one literary tradition at least? In my view it is, but perhaps the curriculum of a linguist should include fewer literary credits and more purely linguistic credits. Perhaps a way would to set up several major/minor combinations even in a monolingual degree like *Filología Inglesa*, with some students choosing a major in Descriptive and Theoretical English Linguistics, others choos-

ing a major in Applied and Descriptive English linguistics, and others choosing a major in English literature. Another option would be to set up degrees in Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, while keeping the present degrees in the various philologies...

Anyway, the way the recommendations of the agreements for a European Higher Education Space are being applied in Spain does not leave room for much optimism in this regard: we should be happy if we retain at least a degree with a major in English language and literature. Of course, metaphor and metonymy studies are a way of bridging the gap. I get every year some undergraduate students primarily interested in English literature in my optional undergraduate subject in Linguistic Theories Applied to English (where I mostly teach an introduction to the cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy) and also some graduate students in our graduate course (together with Javier Valenzuela, Ana Rojo and José Antonio Mompeán) on cognitive linguistics (a part of which is devoted to metaphor and metonymy).

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: I sincerely believe that it is possible to make relevant connections between linguistics and literature. In both cases we are talking about texts, although from very different perspectives and with radically different (though not necessarily incompatible) methodologies. One of the applications of cognitive linguistics is precisely literature. This burgeoning field is known as cognitive poetics or cognitive stylistics, where we have people like Margaret Freeman and Gerard Steen involved. I was recently impressed by a doctoral dissertation where there is an application of a modified version of blending theory to the analysis of the work of Seamus Heaney. There is a lot that can be revealed about how writers create texts and about how interpretation may go on when you have solid knowledge of cognitive processes, cultural models, and their communicative impact. cognitive linguistics belongs right there.

Question: What attracts your graduate students to cognitive linguistics?

Antonio Barcelona: Some of them seem to be interested in the connections it uncovers between form and concepts. Others are surprised to discover the ubiquity of metaphor and metonymy in everyday language and thought, and the beauty of the "poetics of mind".

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: Undergraduate programs give an overview of everything that has been done in synchronic and diachronic linguistics. Students are able to feel the strong limitations of some research agendas. So if they are really interested in language, when they think of doing theur own research as graduate students, they easily turn their eyes to an approach that can say quite a good deal virtually about any aspect of language. This is one of the great virtues of cognitive

linguistics. Besides, cognitive linguistics is appealing to them because it is intuitive; they can even start from scratch and go into a lot of detail in comparably little time. cognitive linguistics analyses are straightforward and intuitive, and at the same time they can be very sophisticated and complex.

Question: Is cognitive linguistics mainstream enough to be taught to Spanish undergrads?

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: As I said before, the cognitive linguistics community is growing at a very fast pace. The amount of literature that is being produced is nowadays immense. I firmly believe that cognitive linguistics has a great future and in fact it has a strong present right now. Just look at the growing number of journals and book series devoted exclusively to CL. It is impressive and exciting at the same time.

Antonio Barcelona: I think that it is not mainstream enough, but it should be taught to Spanish undergraduates nonetheless, at least by showing them its usefulness in the explanation or description of some well-known phenomena. I often do this in my English descriptive grammar classes and my students often enjoy this new perspective. Most students are surprised when one points out to them the abstract similarity that exists between lifting a barrier blocking a billiard ball so it can pursue its course and granting someone permission to do something; that is the force-dynamic basis of modal meaning. Perhaps one of the things the Spanish Cognitive Linguistics Association could do is to devise a systematic strategy to assist those instructors in English, Spanish or other departments wishing to incorporate at least some aspects of cognitive linguistics to their teaching.

3   Bedtime Reading

Question: If you were stranded on a desert island, what ten linguistics articles or books would you most like to have brought along with you?

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: Lakoff & Johnson's *Philosophy in the Flesh*, Langacker's *Grammar and conceptualization*, Talmy's *Toward a Cognitive Semantics*, Fauconnier & Turner's *The Way We Think*, Tomasello's *The cultural origins of human cognition*, and perhaps a couple of edited volumes: *Cognitive exploration of language and linguistics*, edited by Dirven and Verspoor, Panther & Radden's *Studies in linguistic motivation*. There are many others I like, but these are a must.

Antonio Barcelona: Oh, I hope that will never be the case; if the island were really desert, I am afraid I would be too busy just trying to survive! But, provided

all of my basic needs were miraculously catered for there, I would have brought *Studies in Words*, by C.S. Lewis, *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson), *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (Lakoff), *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (I and II)*, by Langacker, *Metonymy in Language and Thought* (Panther and Radden), a complete collection of the journals *Cognitive Linguistics* and *Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics*, *The Way We Think* (Fauconnier and Turner), and *Toward a Cognitive Semantics I and II* (Talmy). But, of course, this selection is somewhat unfair and leaves out many other titles that I would have brought along for my sea voyage.

Question: And which of these books or articles would you have liked to have written yourselves?

Francisco Ruiz de Mendoza: *Philosophy in the Flesh*, beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Antonio Barcelona: All of them—there is no harm in dreaming a bit. But, if pressed hard to choose one or two, I would choose *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things*, and/or *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (I and II)*. These were really the seminal works in cognitive linguistics.